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This paper poses the question as to whether a “cyber-attack” by a state against another
state might breach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Although this question is
not new, and the answers to it are either by no means consistent or far too clear for the
uncertainty of a military field, this paper expresses significant concerns that some of the
basic military issues may have been overlooked in contextualizing cyber-attack in United
Nations Charter jurisprudence. Its methodology is delimited to discussing the nature of
cyber-attack, but only on a basis between one sovereign state and another sovereign state.
The paper is further delimited by reference to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and how that
article might be considered breached. Interwoven throughout the paper is a proposition
that cyber-attack is intended to be a military action in the nature of maneuver warfare as
an instance of Aristotelian ethical deliberation and action, and further, it is always
intended to have military consequences. The inference from this is that a cyber-attack is
intended to have kinetic effects in the same way as fraud and deception infer physical
effects, and therefore, is intended to have effects similar to those of conventional warfare.
The paper begins with an examination of kinetic precepts underlying cyber warfare. Then,
the paper looks at how attacks on information might represent a kind of warfare. With an
abiding concern to include practical military thought, to represent the uncertainty of war,
the paper discusses the nature of maneuver warfare, based on Lind's practical military
discussion of the term. The next phase of the paper surveys the relevant international law
and international law precepts, followed by a brief look at relevant case law. The paper
concludes with a suggestion that the information operations inherent in cyber-attacks are
essentially and necessarily a priori to a kinetic consequence.
© 2015 Gary Lilienthal and Nehaluddin Ahmad. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.1. Introduction
This paper asks whether a “cyber-attack” by one state against
another might be a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
This question is not new, and the answers to it are either by noege of Law, Government
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some of the basicmilitary issuesmay have been overlooked in
contextualizing the law of cyber-attack in United Nations
Charter jurisprudence. The effects of a breach of article 2(4)
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global international community. This suggests an increased
likelihood of national armed response as self help.1
Its methodology is delimited to discussing the nature of
cyber-attack but only on the basis between one sovereign
state and another sovereign state. The paper has a further
delimitation by reference to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and
how that article might be considered breached. Interwoven
throughout the paper is a proposition that cyber-attack is
intended to be a military action in the nature of maneuver
warfare, and further, it is always intended to have military
consequences. The inference from this is that cyber-attack is
intended to have kinetic effects, or effects due to some kind of
physical motion, in the sameway as deception infers physical
effects and, therefore, is intended to have effects similar to
those of conventional warfare.
The paper begins with an examination of kinetic precepts
underlying cyber warfare, because international actors
designed the laws ofwar in the context of kinetic technologies.2
Then, the paper looks at how attacks on information might
represent a kind of warfare.With an abiding concern to include
practical military thought, to represent the uncertainty of war,
the paper discusses the nature of maneuver warfare, based on
Lind's practical military discussion of the term. The next phase
of the paper is to survey the relevant international law and
international law precepts, followed by a brief look at relevant
case law. Finally, the paper draws relevant conclusions.
The paper is likely to conclude with a suggestion that the
information operations inherent in cyber-attacks are essen-
tially and necessarily a priori to a kinetic consequence. The
Estonian cyber-attacks of 2007will illustrate this. In that attack,
moving the statue of the Bronzed Russian Soldier could have
been construed as a perceived attack on sovereignty, naturally
precipitating violence. Also, the chain of argument will infer
that even when a cyber-attack does not breach Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter, application to the United Nations Security
Council for remedial action might produce action. That action
would be as if the cyber-attack were indeed a breach.2. Cyber warfare
Parks and Duggan differed from other scholars in that they
regarded cyber-attacks as only likely to be kinetic in nature.
They examined the theory of kinetic precepts underlying
cyber warfare; the word kinetic meaning the kind of force,
including the movement of a weapon, which would have
physically damaging effects on an enemy recipient.3 Referring
to the ancient text of Sun Tsu on The Art of War,4 they1 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on De-
velopments in the Field of Information & Telecommunications in
the Context of International Security, 65th Session, ¶1, UN Doc A/
65/201, July 30, 2010.
2 Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, (2102),
30(2) Berkeley Journal of International Law, 526.
3 Raymond C. Parks and David P. Duggan, 'Principles of Cyber-
warfare', (2001) Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Workshop on Infor-
mation Assurance and Security, United States Military Academy,
West Point 122, 122e125.
4 Sun Tsu, The Art of War (Dover, 2002).
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itary principles. These were objective, mass, surprise, offen-
sive, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command,
simplicity and security. They conducted their examination
with a view to assessing to what extent, if any, these princi-
ples applied to cyber warfare. Arguably, an outcome of this
exercise would serve to characterise the extent to which cyber
warfare was indeed kinetic warfare.
They suggested the kinetic precept of mass was effectively
irrelevant to cyber-warfare, unless in the case of denial of
service attacks, simulating kinetic warfare. They argued that
the kinetic precept of objective was applicable in cyber-
warfare since the precept of objective formed part of all
types of warfare. They argued that the kinetic precept of
offensive was not very relevant to cyber-warfare, in which
stealth and surprise were far more important. They noted
that, at the Cyber Strategy Workshop in October of 1999, del-
egates made analogies between cyber-warfare and submarine
warfare, and also, analogies between cyber-warfare and spe-
cial operations. They observed that both analogieswere good.5
Thus, a submarine could conduct both overt and covert
operations, acting in peacetime as a deterrent by performing
surveillance operations and information gathering. In times of
war, a submarine could carry out surveillance and informa-
tion gathering, communication of data, landing of special
operations forces, attack of land targets, protection of task
forces and merchant shipping. It could deny to an enemy
certain areas of the seas. Submarines required no vulnerable
logistics chain, nor depended for survivability on any mutual
defence from other sources.6
In the editors' general introduction to Special Operations in
US Strategy, they cited Tugwell and Charters’ proposed
description of special operations.7 As a legal definition, it is
arguably unusable:
Small-scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unor-
thodox or frequently high-risk nature could be undertaken to
achieve significant political or military objectives in support of
foreign policy. Special operations are characterized by either
simplicity or complexity, by subtlety and imagination, by the
discriminate use of violence, and by oversight at the highest level.
Military and non-military resources, including intelligence as-
sets, may be used in concert.8
Isenberg suggested that special operations were a way to
maintain low intensity conflict,9 not inconsistent with the
apparent goal of cyber-attack. Putting these views together,
special operations appeared to be small-scale risky ventures,
of a subtle nature, and probably meaning highly deceptive,5 Raymond C. Parks and David P. Duggan, 'Principles of Cyber-
warfare', (2001) Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Workshop on Infor-
mation Assurance and Security, United States Military Academy,
West Point 122, 123.
6 Dan van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, Harper & Row, 1988.
7 F. Barnett, B. Tovar, R. Shultz (eds.), Special Operations in US
Strategy, National Defence University Press, New York, 1988, at p.
9.
8 Ibid.
9 David Isenberg, ‘Special Forces: Shock Troops for the New
Order’, 177 Middle East Report, (1992), pp. 24e27, at p. 24.
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sources of intelligence available to the top levels of govern-
ment. There seems to be here an analogy to cyber-attack.
Also, Isenberg observed that the cyber terrorist model
closely matched an assassin's profile.10 Schmitt suggested
that an assassination could be understood, from the classic
law of war prohibition on treacherously killing the enemy.11
He clarified by observing that treacherous acts violated a tar-
get's belief that those around him or her posed no threat,12
which sounded like a vernacular description of deception.
Thus, offering a bounty or reward for the death of an enemy,
was also regarded as treacherous.13 The Lieber Code of 1863
discussed assassination,14 in the following terms:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual
belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the
hostile government an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by
any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such
international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage.
The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in
consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority.
Civilized nations look with horror upon offers or rewards for the
assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.15
Even although the offeror of the reward did no killing, the
monetary inducement made it more inevitable. It appeared
that a reward foran assassination would be similar to cyber-
attack if the natural consequences of the attack were ki-
netic. According to Parks and Duggan, in neither of these
cases, of submarines or assassins, was the offensive as crucial
as it was in a conventional war. The kinetic precept of surprise
did apply to cyber-warfare, just as cyber-warfare was a
deployment of the kinetic precept of economy in force. The
kinetic precept of maneuver was also applicable in cyber-
warfare, because, in this mode, the attacker was only mov-
ing the point of attack. The kinetic precept of unity of com-
mand also was applicable in cyber-warfare. The kinetic
precept of security applied to cyber-warfare, as did the kinetic
precept of simplicity.16
Parks and Duggan argued that cyber-warfare had to have
kinetic world effects, this kind of warfare being meaningless
unless affecting something in the real world. Cyber-warfare
could move a real object, such as opening a dam spill-gate,
or shutting down an electrical substation. This was similar10 The United States Department of the Army Memorandum of
Law on Assassination, by W. Hays Parks, discussed Executive
Order 12333 and stated that assassination was unlawful. The
Memorandum of Law suggested that assassination is murder by
sudden or secret attack.
11 Michael N. Schmitt, Essays on Law and War at the Fault Lines
(Asser Press, The Hague, 2012), at p. 285.
12 Ibid, at p. 312.
13 Ibid, at p. 308.
14 The Lieber Code of 1863. War Department, Adjutant General's
Office, Washington, 1863.
15 The Lieber Code of 1863. War Department, Adjutant General's
Office, Washington, 1863, section IX.
16 Raymond C. Parks and David P. Duggan, 'Principles of Cyber-
warfare', (2001) Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Workshop on Infor-
mation Assurance and Security, United States Military Academy,
West Point 122, 122e125.
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cision-makers’minds in the real world. It was more by way of
information warfare, where given information caused incor-
rect decisions by tactical and strategic decision-makers.
Tactical decision-makers could be deceived about the size
and location of the enemy forces. Strategic decision-makers
might be deceived by their attributing enemy actions to the
wrong countries.17
However, suggesting a genus problem with their method-
ology for analysis, Parks and Duggan concluded that cyber-
warfare was still different from kinetic war. Both cyber-
warfare and the more general information warfare depended
on human weaknesses. Kinetic warfare was in the real world.
Cyber-warfarewas in an artificial world, inherently chaotic and
more imperfect than the physical world. While cyber-warfare
might use some precepts of kinetic warfare, others had little
significance in cyberspace. For these reasons, the precepts of
cyber-warfare were not the same as those in kinetic warfare.18
However, they found that submarine war and special opera-
tions, as well as the operational profile of the assassin, were
essentially the same as cyber warfare. This view was at odds
with those of other scholars, such as Roscini,19who preferred to
regard cyber-attacks as entirely non-kinetic.
Roscini was of an oblique view to that of Parks and Duggan,
applying a genus in the nature of fraud to the discussion. He
stated that cyber-attacks fell within themore general category
of information operations, and apparently excluded them
from being defined as including the use of kinetic force. He
defined information operations, somewhat unhelpfully, as
employing the central know-how of electronic warfare. This
know-how included computer networking, psychological
tactics, traditional military deceit, essentially to make war on
the adversary's decision-making while protecting that of the
cyber attacker.20
Although often theywere publicly labeled as cyber-attacks,
information operations might focus solely on intelligence
collection and observation. They could be for propaganda
purposes, (as also could assassinations), or for breaching the
confidentiality of sensitive information on computer sys-
tems.21 This kind of practice suggested a less kinetic use but
ignored the arguably more in-depth technical analysis of
Parks and Duggan, as above.
These information operations were attacks aimed at
destroying the value of information in the target computer, to
incapacitate the enemy's command system. This kind of
attack could also result in damage outside to the target com-
puters, in some chain of causation. This outcome could be by
viruses, or by the corruption of computer hardware or soft-
ware, or flooding it with so many data that it collapsed - a
denial of service attack. A virus was a software tool that might
attach itself to a normal program to modify it and other con-
nected computers.2217 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 125.
19 Marco Roscini, ‘World Wide Warfare - Jus ad Bellum and the
Use of Cyber Force’, in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (eds),
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27 Ibid.
28 [1903] 1 Ch 728, 732e733.
29 Ibid.
30 P. Naraynam Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (Eastern Law
House, 6th Ed, 2007), p. 698.
31 Ibid, 699.
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ostensibly non-kinetic attacks, if the recipient state could
identify the state source of the cyber-attack and ascribe the
belligerent conduct to that state, there would be several rem-
edies available to the aggrieved state party. It could refer the
state of affairs to the United Nations Security Council under
Article 35 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter. The Security Council
could act, under Article 36 paragraph 1, to recommend appro-
priate methodologies for settling the dispute. If the Security
Council established additionally that this reported state of af-
fairs was a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of
international aggression, it might additionally use its powers,
under Chapter VII. Roscini argued that even when observers
judged cyber-attacks as breaches of international peace, or acts
of international aggression, they still might amount to a threat
to the international peace. It appears that the United Nations
Charter drafters’ intentions were to limit the concept of
breaches of international peace or acts of international
aggression, to an international use of orthodox armed force.
However, Roscini observed that the scope had been expanded
over the years. The result was, according to Roscini, that almost
anything could be characterised as a threat to the international
peace in Security Council deliberations.23 Roscini suggests that
the Security Council could impose a cyber-blockade on the
responsible state to avert continuation of the cyber-attacks.24
Thus, it could be argued that a cyber-attack, while not being a
breach of Article 2(4) of the UNCharter, might still be treated as
if it were the equivalent.
Roscini observed that the main questions were whether a
cyber-attack amounted to an act over the minimum required
for the use of force, if it was an actual use of force, or whether
it amounted to armed attack. In the absence of specific jus ad
bellum rules, there were only the provisions contained in the
UN Charter and the customary international law. These rules
were flexible enough to extend to new kinds of warfare.
Thus, Roscini concluded that cyber-force could be charac-
terised as armed force, per Article 2 paragraph 4 of the UN
Charter.25
Although Parks and Duggan apparently concluded that
cyber warfare was somewhat different from kinetic warfare,
their interlocutory argument agreed with the propositions
that submarine war and special operations, as well as the
operational profile of the assassin, were essentially the same
as cyber warfare. Arguably, these styles of warfare might well
involve, or be, kinetic warfare. Thus, Roscini's conclusions
arguably suffered a similar irony. It could be stated this way:
since the effect of cyber-attacks was like attacks on the mind,
there was no kinetic warfare. The discussion requires a better
understanding of deceit and kinetic outcomes, and how it
might apply to cyber-attack.
Thus, the law has for many centuries recognised a likely
relationship between deceit and some physical or kinetic
outcome. The following old statute,26 illustrated this rela-
tionship, as follows:23 Ibid, 109.
24 Ibid, 110.
25 Ibid, 130.
26 13 Ric II Stat 1 c 11 at 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377e1504, 64.
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that the merchants that buy the same cloths, and carry them out
of the realm to sell to strangers, be many times in danger to be
slain, and sometime imprisoned, and put to fine and ransom by
the same estrangers, and their said cloths burnt or forfeit,
because of the great deceit and falsehood that is found in the same
cloths when they be untacked and opened, to the great slander of
the cloths of the Realm of England.27
This statutory provision suggested that the legislators
knew that the deceiving of purchasers had precipitated the
strong possibility of killing, because of the secret defects and
later realisation ofmisrepresentation. Relating fraud to deceit,
in the 1903 case of In re London and Globe Finance Corpn,
Limited,28 Buckley Jdefined fraud and deceit as follows:
To deceive is, to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which
is false, and which the person practicing the deceit knows or
believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit; it is by
deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be
put, that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to
defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action.29
Narayanan proposed that fraud could take various forms.30
He called them “badges” of common law fraud. He proposed
that badges of fraud were not species of fraud, but were indicia
of fraud, or put another way; they were indicative of fraud.31
These are how the recipient of the cyber-attack might sense
the attack.
The 1601 Twyne's Case32 dealt with badges of fraud. Smith
recorded that the circumstances in the Star Chamber hearing
of Twyne's Case33 were as follows.34 There was a Bill of Infor-
mation filed in the Star Chamber by the Queen's Attorney-
General Coke against Twyne of Hampshire for the making
and publishing of a fraudulent gift of goods. Pierce was
indebted to Twyne in the amount of £400 and was also
indebted to C in the amount of £200. C brought an action in
debt against Pierce who, being in possession of the goods to
the value of £300, executed a secret deed of gift of all of his
goods and chattels real and personal to Twyne, pending the
resolution of thewrit. This deedwas to be in satisfaction of his
debt, even though he remained in possession of the trans-
ferred goods. Sir Thomas Egerton, Lord Keeper of the Great
Seal, Chief Justice Popham, Anderson J and the whole Court of
Star Chamber resolved that this gift was fraudulent.35
The Court stated the following six points.36 The first was
that the gift had the signs and marks of fraud because the gift32 (1601) 3 Co Rep 80b; 76 ER 809.
33 Ibid.
34 Digested in John William Smith A Selection of Leading Cases
on Various Branches of the Law with Notes, Vol I (A. Maxwell, 2nd
ed, 1841), 1e14.
35 3 Co Rep 80a, 80b, 81a.
36 3 Co Rep 80a, 81a.
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personal necessity. It was said commonly that quod dolosus
versatur in genrealibus.37 The second was the donor continued
in possession, used them as his own property, traded them,
and therefore defrauded and deceived those with whom he
traded. The third was the gift was made in secret, and et dona
clandestine sunt semper suspiciosa.38 The fourth was that it was
made pending the writ. The fifth was there was a trust be-
tween the parties because the donor possessed all the prop-
erty, and fraud is always clad in trust and trust is a cover for
fraud. The sixth was there was a clause in the deed that the
gift was made honestly, truly and bona fide.39
Along with the maneuvers of any submarines, special op-
erations or assassins, arguably comes the deceptive art of
generalities, secrecy and false trust. Each of these may be
present in a cyber-attack. These arts may induce a state of
mind, followed in the enemy recipient by an ill-advised course
of action or omission. Such action or omission could precipitate
kinetic outcomes. It remains to consider the causal relationship
between the actions or omission and the kinetic outcomes, first
by looking at the practicalities of maneuver warfare.3. Maneuver warfare
Maneuver warfare aims at defeating the enemy by disrupting
its ability to react. This proposition could include disrupting
its ability to decide how to act, or decide whether or not to act.
Thus, in the maneuver warfare paradigm, conflict can be
seen as timeecompetitive cycles of observation–orientation–
decision–action.40 Each party to a conflict begins by observing.
He observes himself, his physical surroundings and his
enemy. On the basis of his observation, he makes mental
images of his situation. On the basis of this orientation, he
makes a decision. He puts the decision into effect, in the form
of action. Then, because he assumes his action has changed
the situation, he observes again and starts the process anew.
His actions follow this cycle, sometimes called the “Boyd
Cycle” or OODA Loop”.41
This Boyd Cycle suggests Aristotle's deliberation and ac-
tion, as necessary components of the ethical deliberative
process. Aristotle stated that the genus of choice belonged to
that of voluntary action,42 by conscious separation of virtues
from vices. The field of deliberation was to discern actions
that were within one's power to perform, in respect of means37 3 Co Rep 80a. dolosus versatur generalibus. A deceiver deals in
generalities. James Morwood (ed), The Oxford Latin Mini Dictionary
(Oxford University Press, 1995).
38 3 Co Rep 80a. Clandestine gifts are always to be regarded with
suspicion.
39 Digested in John William Smith A Selection of Leading Cases on
Various Branches of the Law with Notes, Vol I (A. Maxwell, 2nd ed,
1841), 2.
40 On this description, the process looks similar in structure to
the Action Research cycle developed by Kurt Lewin. See Kurt
Lewin, ‘The Research Center for Group Dynamics at Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology’, 8(2) Sociometry (1945), pp. 126e136.
41 W. S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook Westview, Boulder,
1985, p. 5.
42 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics (H. Rackham trans.) Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 133.
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tion were the same, only such that the object of choice was a
thing within our power which after due deliberation we
desire. This object must be distinguished from wishes, which
are only for ends.43 Finally, Aristotle described this delibera-
tive principle as manifesting itself, as a necessary conse-
quence, in any one or more of the actions of admonishment,
rebuke and exhortation.44 On the Nichomachean Ethics
model, all maneuver decisions are ethical actions as neces-
sary outcomes of separating virtues from vices, within the
process of deliberation.
According to Lind, if one side in a conflict can consistently
go through the Boyd Cycle faster than the other, it gains a
substantial advantage. By the time the slower side acts, the
faster side is doing something different from what he
observed, and his action becomes inappropriate in the new
context. With each cycle, the slower party's action is inap-
propriate by a larger timemargin. Even though he desperately
strives to do something that will work, each action is less
useful than its predecessor; he falls further behind. Ulti-
mately, he ceases to be effective.45
Maneuver warfare requires commanders who can sense
more than they can see, who understand both the opponent's
and their own strengths and weaknesses. It requires those
who can find the enemy's critical weaknesses in a specific
situation. They must be able to create multiple threats and
keep the enemy uncertain as to which threat is real, arguably
the technique explained in the assassin's treachery. They
must be able to visualise their options in the situation,
constantly generate new options, and shift rapidly among
those options as the situation develops.46
Maneuver warfare tactics combine two basic elements:
techniques and education. Techniques may be by formula.
They include how to aim a rifle, set up a machine gun, give an
order, establish communications, call in fire support, gun
crew drills, unit battle drills and so on.47
Mission-type orders are key to the decentralization of
command necessary for a rapid Boyd Cycle. A mission-type
order tells the subordinate commander what his superior
wants to have accomplished. That is the mission. It leaves the
methodology for accomplishing it largely up to a subordinate.
This subordinate needs to understand the commander's intent
two levels up. Commander's intent is a superset of themission.
A maneuver warfare military believes that it is better to have
high levels of initiative among subordinate officers, generating
a resultant rapid Boyd Cycle, even if the price is occasional
mistakes. Indeed, control is replaced with guidance.48
A very important tool in maneuver warfare is the counter-
attack. A counter-attack is an attack on the enemy's attack.
Also, it is an action taken after the enemyhas committed itself
irrevocably. In the defence, as in the offence, the practitioner
wants to shatter the cohesion of the enemy's units, not just43 Ibid, p. 141.
44 Ibid, p. 67.
45 W. S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook Westview, Boulder,
1985, p. 6.
46 Ibid, p. 7.
47 Ibid, p. 12.
48 Ibid, pp. 13, 14.
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achieving this is the counter-attack. In general, the counter-
attack must have three characteristics to be successful. First,
it must be strong. Second, the counterattack must achieve
surprise by striking the advancing enemy at a weak point
created by his own forward momentum. Most critical, the
success of a counterattack depends upon timing. The com-
mander must be able to sense that point in time when the
enemy, exposed and tiring, is incapable of rapid response to
an unexpected threat.49 This description is not inconsistent
with a cyber-attack.
Lind advised that attack by infiltration was often used in
maneuver warfare. Themost common assault technique uses
a three-element force: (a) a large suppression element; (b) a
small penetrating element; and, (c) a large exploitation
element. The suppression element makes the enemy keep his
head down at the point of the assault. The penetrating
element makes a small breach in the enemy's position. The
exploitation element goes through the breach, fans out the
enemy's rear, and collapses his position from the rear. Some of
the exploitation element immediately drives deeper into the
enemy's rear, looking for surfaces and gaps, so the assault can
immediately turn into an advance.50 This description also is
not inconsistent with a cyber-attack.
Gaps are found by delegating authority down to the lowest
level so that small unit commanders can find gaps and
immediately start exploiting them. The term flank itself needs
some elaboration. John Boyd defined a flank as “that aspect
towards which a force is not devoting its primary attention.”51
On this basis, maneuver warfare might be described as the
fast manufacture and infiltration of new enemy flanks. Cyber-
attack may arguably be written expressly for this dual pur-
pose, and when added to deceit and fraud theory might pro-
duce a necessary kinetic result.53 U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1e02, Nov. 8, 2010, as
amended through Feb. 15, 2012, available at http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/dod_dictionary/.
54 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘“Attack” as a Term of Art in International
Law: The Cyber Operations Context’, 2012 4th International
Conference on Cyber Conflict, pp. 283e293, at p. 291.
55 G Tunkin, Law and Force in the International System (Progress
Publishers, 1985).4. International law
Discussion has now set out parallels between, on the one
hand, submarine war, special operations, and assassinations,
and having examined how an information operation, in the
nature of maneuver warfare affecting the mind, might have a
kinetic outcome. This sectionwill try to contextualise a breach
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter within three well-known
cyber-attacks: the Iran centrifuge attack; the 2007 Estonian
attacks; and, the U2 shooting down over the former Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.
Hathaway et al. adopted a wide definition of cyber-attack.
They said it was “any action taken to undermine the func-
tions of a computer network for a political or national security
purpose”.52 Leaving aside for now the “political or national
security purpose” facet of their definition, they appeared to
agree that a cyber-attackwas similar in process to amaneuver
warfare attack.49 Ibid, pp. 22, 22.
50 Ibid, p. 45.
51 Ibid, p. 76.
52 Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, ‘The Law of
Cyber-Attack’, 100(4) California Law Review (2012), pp. 817e885, at
p. 826.
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Terms defined “computer network attack” (CNA) as “[a]ctions
taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny,
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and
computer networks, or the computers and networks them-
selves.”53 From this description, there is less doubt that ma-
neuver warfare and cyber warfare have much in common.
Schmitt derived a general principle for the legal precept of
attack, relevant to the cyber context. He stated that attacks
could be redefined as operations resulting in, or if unsuc-
cessful were originally projected to result in, death or injury of
individual people, or destruction to, or damage of objects.54 In
essence, and considering the entropic effects of the Boyd cy-
cles in maneuver warfare, a cyber-attack might well be con-
structed to be within the parameters of maneuver warfare.
Buchan noted that, since early in the life of Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter, scholars55 had wondered whether this article
covered only armed force or whether it covered the use of
more general political and economic coercion.56
The rules for treaty interpretation are in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT), which pro-
vides that Article 2(4) must be interpreted using these rules.
Article 31 of the VCLT provides that treaty termsmust be their
ordinary meaning, in the context of the treaty's purpose and
objects. Buchan noted that this article reflected customary
international law.57 Giving the word ‘force’ its ordinary
meaning suggests Article 2(4) covers all uses of force. Signifi-
cantly, other loci in the UN Charter use the term ‘armed force’.
Thus also, the UN Charter preamble explains that armed force
must not be used, unless it is used in the common interest.
Also, Articles 41e46 allow the Security Council to use mea-
sures without armed force, or, if inadequate, armed forcemay
be used. The use of the term ‘force’ without being noted as
armed, in Article 2(4), infers that it ismore general than armed
force. This interpretation arguably could include both eco-
nomic force and political force. However, this proposed
meaning has to be verified against the text of the treaty.
This outcome, vis-a-vis the meaning of the term ‘force’ is
arguably an opening of the door for a non-kinetic kind of force,
although not yet litigated. Arguably, when looking at the
deceived cloth buyer's analogy, discussed above, their moving
to slay the deceiving cloth seller suggested some forcemoving
their actions. Thus, there is a suggestion that some inchoate
force might operate, a priori to a kinetic style of force.56 Russell Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or
Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17(2) Journal of Conflict and
Security Law, 212, 215.
57 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 [‘ … [a]rticles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties… may in many re-
spects be considered as a codification of existing customary in-
ternational law… ’ [1991] ICJ Rep 69 70, para 48.
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meaning if it defeated the Treaty's stated purposes and ob-
jectives.58 Buchan interpreted the UN Charter as stating that
the over-arching purpose of the UN was to preserve interna-
tional peace and security, by preventing armed force by
member states, and removing it to a collective military sys-
tem.59 However, the meaning of the term “armed force” must
be examined. First, the term “armed”inferred the subsistence
of a weapon. Black's Law Dictionary describes “armed” as
equipped with a weapon, or involving the use of a weapon,60
without providing enough to explain how this weapon could
violate Article 2(4).61 Further, the question arises as to the
character of aweapon, andwhy aweapon should not be either
tangible or inchoate. For example, aweapon could be a gun. Or
in the alternative, a weapon could be a deceptive or inflam-
matory statement so extreme as to move someone to kinetic
action. In this event, it could be argued that the kinetic actor
was under the attacker's control, and, therefore, acting as the
attacker's agent. With this view, I argue that information op-
erations provoking a physical attack by way of response could
be considered either kinetic, per se, or a necessary precondi-
tion to the kinetic response.
Bond argued that armed force implied a weapon producing
moving, or kinetic, force. This term was a generalisation
applied to weapons with an explosive effect, accompanied by
shockwaves and increased heat.62 Brownlie criticized this
view, because it would exclude chemical, nuclear and bio-
logical weapons.63 On Brownlie's critique, a biological weapon
affecting an enemy's decision-making or psychological abili-
ties would be indistinguishable in character from a cyber-
attack producing the same physical consequence.
Brownlie argued that a better test for whether an unlawful
use of force took place waswhether the weapon destroyed life
and property.64 Arguably, Brownlie did not follow through to
the natural ends of his argument. However, Buchan called this
approach an effects-based approach, and regarded it as more
workable in the context of cyber war. Thus, the National
Research Council described death or personal injury, and
destruction of tangible property, as elements for defining the
use of force, without suggesting this was an exhaustive list of
elements.65 The reader might reflect that if tangible property
were not exhaustive of property, then property might include58 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP, 2007), 235.
59 Russell Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or
Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17(2) Journal of Conflict and
Security Law 212, 215.
60 B. Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (West, 2009), 123.
61 Russell Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or
Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17(2) Journal of Conflict and
Security Law 212, 216.
62 J. Bond, ‘Peacetime Foreign Data Manipulation as One Aspect
of Offensive InformationWarfare: Questions of Legality under the
United Nations Charter Article’ 2(4) (1996) US Dept of Commerce,
National Technical Information Service, 78.
63 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States
(Clarendon, 1963), 362.
64 Ibid.
65 ‘Committee on Offensive Information Warfare and others,
Technology, Policy Law and Ethics Regarding US Acquisition and
Use of Cyberattack Capabilities Report’ (2009) National Research
Council, 253.
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debate by claiming that cyber-attacks should cause physical
damage, to be unlawful use of force.66 However, Sharp argued
that any cyber-attack by a state, intentionally causing
destruction inside another state, would be an unlawful
deployment of force.67 There is no indication of what Sharp
meant by destruction, but arguably, destruction of informa-
tion or intelligence were also destruction.
I will now contextualise this discussion with the Iran
cyber-attacks of 2010. Buchen suggested these principles were
sufficient to assess the 2010 Iran cyber-attacks, to examine
further those kinds of cyber-attack breaching Article 2(4).68 He
observed that in July 2010, the Iranian government found a
computer virus installed in its computers, now known as
Stuxnet. The apparent target was at Iran's Natanz nuclear
facility, a uranium enrichment factory. The methodology for
uranium enrichment was by putting it in many centrifuges,
spun at a designated speed, with controlled pressure and
temperature. Stuxnet was designed to change the centrifuges'
rotor speed covertly, greatly increasing and then rapidly
decreasing the speed.69
The Institute for Science and International Security had
explained that by increasing and decreasing the speed of
rotation in this way, the effect of the Stuxnet virus was to
induce excessive vibrations in the centrifuges, enough to
destroy the centrifuges.70 Mechanical engineers would un-
doubtedly view this as a natural consequence of the effects of
the software, and therefore regard the attacking software as
directly causative of physical damage. Buchan reported evi-
dence implying that Iran replaced about 1000 centrifuges at
Natanz, and that Stuxnet was a reasonable cause. However,
the exact causal chain from the Stuxnet virus cannot be
ascertained. If the Stuxnet virus did destroy centrifuges at
Natanz, this would be arguably sufficient physical damage to
establish a breach of Article 2(4).71
To the contrary, and by way of further contextualisation,
were the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia. In 2007, the
Government of Estonia announced it would move its statue of
the Bronze Russian Solider to the outer parts of Tallinn.
Buchan observed that this triggered violent rioting and looting
in Estonia's capital city, Tallinn, apparently by ethnic Russian
residents of Tallinn. These demonstrations coincided with
cyber-attacks against Estonian businesses. Some large busi-
nesses, such as banks, were attacked. As well, the attacks
were targeted against Estonian government instrumentalities.
They were, in the main, distributed denial of service attacks.66 Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (CUP, 2010), 88.
67 W. G. Sharp Sr., CyberSpace and the Use of Force (Ageis
Research Corp, 1999), 133.
68 Russell Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or
Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17(2) Journal of Conflict and
Security Law, 212, 217.
69 Ibid, 219.
70 D. Albright, P Brannan and C Walrond, ‘Did Stuxnet Take Out
1000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant? Institute for
Science and International Security’ (2010) Institute for Science
and International Security.
71 Russell Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or
Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17(2) Journal of Conflict and
Security Law 212, 221.
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networks of compromised computers, to be used without the
owners' knowledge. There were about 85,000 highjacked
computers bombarding Estonian web sites with information
requests. These cyber-attacks went on for about three weeks
and brought downmany internet-based systems. The Russian
government denied they were responsible in any way for
these cyber-attacks. Their involvement has never been
proven. However, despite this, Estonia argued that Russia was
the entity responsible for the cyber-attacks.72
Buchan observed that, unlike what might have taken place
in a nuclear attack, the Estonian cyber-attacks apparently did
not cause any physical damage.73 Although, arguably, no
investigation could have been completed that might reason-
ably have followed all causal chains to their logical ends.Were
this type of exhaustive investigation to have taken place, it
could be argued that at least some consequent physical
damage could have been identified.
A breach of Article 2(4) would take place only where a
weapon was used, producing physical damage. Buchan
concluded that since there was no physical damage, the
Estonian cyber-attacks could not be characterised as any un-
lawful use of force, per Article 2(4).74 Hinkle adjudged the
situation similarly. He reasoned that since no human lives
had been lost, no military were deployed across any interna-
tional borders, and neither was there any explosive weapons
used, the Estonian Cyber-attack did not cause any physical
damage.75 However, both Buchan and Hinkle appeared to
have ignored the fact that the Estonianmoving of the statue of
the Bronzed Russian Soldier could be seen as interference to
perceived sovereignty. Naturally, it would precipitate some
kind of violence. Also, arguably, neither Buchan nor Hinkle
took UN top-level objectives into account.
Schaap argued that international peace was the main
rationale for the United Nations. He stated that the UN
Charter, as well as the general international law, prohibited-
states using force, unless for legitimate self-defense, per
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter
states that all member states should settle international dis-
putes peacefully, so as not to endanger international peace
and security. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that all
memberstatesshouldforebear, in international relationships,
from threatening or using force against the territory or inde-
pendence of another state. The key term in this wordage, for
the purposes of this paper's argument, is the use of the word
“threatening”. After all, might not a cyber-attack be regarded
as a threat of force? Article 51 of the UN Charter, which is the
only exception to individual members using force without
Security Council approval, states that nothing in the UN
Charter should prejudice the innate right of self-defence in
the event of an armed attack against a member of the United
Nations. This article appears to be limited by the Security72 Ibid, 218.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid, 219.
75 K. Hinkle, ‘Countermeasures in the Cyber Context: One More
Thing to Worry About’ (2011) 37 Yale Journal of International Law
Online 11, at pp. 13e14.
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In Nicaragua v United States,76discussed further below, the
International Court of Justice stated that thisUN Charter pro-
hibition on using force was merely restating a principle of the
customary international law. However, the UN Charter
defined neither the use of force nor the meaning of an armed
attack. Later, the paper will examine why characterisation as
customary international law is so important to a view that
information operations are essentially a priorito a kinetic
consequence.
Schaap suggested that the General Assembly's resolution
defining aggression77 would be a good starting point for
examining the problem at hand.78 Article 1 of the stated Res-
olution appears similar to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The
resolution states that aggression is constituted by the state's
use of armed force against the sovereignty, territory or inde-
pendence of a second state. Article 3 of the resolution lists
seven kinds of aggressive acts, and Article 4 adds that this list
is not exhaustive.
According to Island of Palmas (The Netherlands v United
States),79 the court held that sovereignty was an attribute of
statehood, implying freedom from any external interference
to the conduct of the state's affairs. Interestingly, the Resolu-
tion allows for a state use of force against sovereignty, one
element of which must be a state's capability for conducting
international relations. Thus, were the reader to imagine the
deployment of deception against a state's interlocutors, where
this deception was a priori due to a kinetic consequence, such
as destruction of files, failure to attend meetings, changes of
policy as to airline corridors, or more, then Schaap's view
might suggest cyber-attacks were substantive kinetic attacks.
This deception would be despite the apparent direction at the
middle phases in Schaap's stated chain of argument.
Cyber warfare operations' violation of the territorial
integrity of another state may be studied in the 1960 U2
aircraft incident. This incident involved the shooting down of
a US reconnaissance aircraft by a missile inside the former
Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union claimed that U2 flights
over their territory were aggressive acts. This claim of
aggression was despite the fact the plane was unarmed. No
doubt, Soviet military experts reacted intelligently to what
they perceived could be the possibilities. The situation was,
arguably, similar to an information operation. The UN Secu-
rity Council concluded that the U2 violated the Soviet Union's
airspace, without constituting an unlawful application of
force, in respect of Article 2(4) of the UNCharter. However, this
was a Security Council conclusion, which might have been
quite political, and ought to be interpreted as quite different
from a likely International Court of Justice determination.
Finally, late in his chain of argument, Schaap wondered
about interfering with supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion systems, which control the power grid, air traffic control,76 1986 ICJ 14, T 188.
77 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/3314, (Dec. 14, 1974).
78 Arie J. Schaap, ‘Cyber Warfare Operations: Development And
Use Under International Law’, (2009) 64 AFL Rev 121, 142.
79 (1928) II RIAA 829.
r-attack as inevitable kinetic war, Computer Law & Security
c om p u t e r l aw & s e c u r i t y r e v i ew x x x ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1e1 1 9and nuclear plant systems.80 He opined correctly that super-
visory control and data acquisition systems attacks could also
cause death by shutting down a hospital or Air Traffic
Control.81
Thus,while therewas nothing confirming a cyber-attack as
equal to unlawful use of force under international law, a
cyber-attack that might cause, or did cause, physical harm
would be an unlawful use of force, or an armed attack.
Arguably, this standard would prohibit cyber warfare opera-
tions against supervisory control and data acquisition
systems.82
Having made a strong case that a cyber-attack might be
either directly or indirectly kinetic, or necessarily and causally a
priori to a kinetic outcome, it remains to discuss the import of
Article 2(4) in the context of customary international law. This
additional examination is made necessary by the inherent
tendency in breaches of customary law to more quickly resort
to violence, on the basis that people expect their customs to be
respected, as they are based on relationships of kinship.
Further, Pulling had stated that, despite his views being pub-
lished before the timeof theUnitedNations Charter, customary
lawswere not subject to desuetude. Thus, when the king's force
to the contrary was removed, the ancient prescriptions auto-
matically returned to operation.83 This aspect of customary law
would be strongly relevant because custom inferred ancient
and therefore strictly prescriptive usage.
In this respect, Pollock had stated that strict liability
appeared ancient and was, therefore, prescriptive. His
reasoning ran as follows. The policy was reflected in the
convenient form of amaxim as maxims facilitated long-term
transmission of a rule. The Romans put it in the form of the
maxim imperitia culpae adnumeratur, or, ‘the situation is
governed by its own class’. This policy was expressed in the
following hypothetical narrative, which illustrated the
inevitable effect on a community of the commission of a civil
wrong: ‘He went about to do harm, and having begun an act
of wrongful mischief, he cannot stop the risk at his pleasure,
nor confine it to the precise objects he laid out, but must
abide it fully and to the end.’ The principle inhering within
this narrative was illustrated within the following maxim: “a
man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his
acts”, combined with the observation that the law naturally
inferred intention and mostly the inference was correct.84
This strict liability would suggest a greater closeness of
violence of the response, and arguably, so would a breach of
custom.
This suggests strongly that when one went about to do
harm, he could be taken to have intended any natural con-
sequences of his actions, meaning the final outcomes were
necessary outcomes. Suggesting that cyber-attack had no ki-
netic outcome might be a failure to look at the entire chain of80 Arie J. Schaap, ‘Cyber Warfare Operations: Development And
Use Under International Law’, (2009) 64 AFL Rev 121, 146.
81 Ibid, 147.
82 Ibid, 148.
83 Alexander Pulling, The Laws, Customs, Usages and Regulations of
the City and Port of London (William Henry Bond and Wildy and
Sons, 2nd ed, 1854), at p. 13.
84 F Pollock, The Law of Torts (Banks and Brothers, 1895), at p. 23.
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inferred from the case law as follows.5. Necessity in the case law
Having discussed breach of customary international law, we
now discuss the seminal case examples. In Nicaragua v
United States,85 the Court found that both the United States
and Nicaraguaagreed that the United Nations Charter's
principles governing the use of force essentially corre-
sponded to those subsisting in customary international law.
The consequence of this finding was that the parties both
accepted an obligation based in treaty law to forebear from
threatening or using force in any way inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4).86 The question
arises as to what treaty law might have been breached when
in 1970 the Estonian Government moved the statue of the
Bronzed Russian Soldier out of sight, precipitating violence.
Would this have been a mere information operation, yet
precipitating physical consequences? Arguably, it was the
operation of necessity.
In the Lotus Case (France v Turkey),87 and in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands),88 an opinio juris
sive necessitatis, also known simply as an opinio juris, was held
to be an opinion deriving from either law, or from necessity.
Arguably, necessity can be seen as operating similarly to the
force of custom. Thus, it was the state's firm conviction that a
specific conduct was required in international law. Therefore,
the state's customary law practice should be understood as
mandatory conduct, and not merely conduct of convenience
or habit.
Thus, theCourt satisfied itself that therewasan opinio juris in
customary law setting up the binding character of this finding.
The court's viewwas that this opinio juris could be deduced from
the parties' attitudestoresolution 2625 (XXV) of the General As-
sembly, called “Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.89 The
Court held that consent to General Assembly resolutions was a
legitimate form of expressing an opinio juris in respect of the
precept against using force. Since Article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Charter of the United Nations subsisted in customary interna-
tional law, regardless of the UN Charter provisions, the strict
treaty-based law applied to the parties.90
The court held the principle of non-intervention as being
the right of a sovereign State to carry on its affairs without
interference from outside. It held that states'opinio jurison
this principle were numerous.91 Thus, a breach of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, Article 2(4) was essentially the
same as a breach of customary international law. As85 1986 ICJ 14, T 188.
86 Ibid, paras 187 to 201.
87 1927 PCIJ ser A No 10.
88 1969 ICJ 3.
89 Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the General Assembly.
90 1986 ICJ 14, T 188, paras 187e201.
91 Ibid, paras 202e209.
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netic outcome, regardless of whether the a priori impulse for
action was the non-kinetic information operations.6. Conclusion
Submarine war and special operations, as well as the oper-
ational profile of the treacherous assassin, have been found
to be essentially the same as cyber warfare. However, the
scholarship suggested that cyber-warfare was more in the
nature of information operations. However, this could be
construed as indistinguishable from the ancient mechanism
of fraud and deception. Argument suggested that it was
likely that, if an information operation might provoke an
armed defence, a kinetic outcome would be the end link in a
chain of causation. The argument suggested that, per the
Estonian cyber-attacks case, investigations were unlikely to
follow the chains of causation all the way down to their final
levels, at which consequential physical damage might be
found.
On Brownlie's critique, a biological weapon affecting an
enemy's decision-making or psychological abilities would be
indistinguishable in character from a cyber-attack producing
the same physical consequence. Buchen deduced that if the
Stuxnet virus did destroy centrifuges at Natanz, this would be
sufficient physical damage to establish a breach of Article 2(4).
Strict liability within customary international law would
suggest a greater likelihood of violence of response, and
arguably, so would a direct breach of custom, such as inter-
fering with sovereignty. Interfering with sovereignty could be
seen to produce spontaneous violent acts, such as for
example, in the Estonian removal of the statue of the Bronzed
Russian Soldier.
In the light of the presented evidence, the suggestion
arises that information operations inherent in cyber-attacks,
just as inmaneuver warfare, are essentially and necessarily a
priori to a kinetic consequence. This suggestion would mean
that there would be a preponderance of circumstances in
which a cyber-attack by one state against another would be a
breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Also, even when a
cyber-attack did not breach Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,
application to the United Nations Security Council for
remedial action might produce action as if the cyber-attack
were indeed a breach. The information operations inherent
in cyber-attacks are essentially and necessarily a priori to a
kinetic consequence.
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